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Abstract 
 
Many Western studies, seeing North Korea through the prism framed by the Cold War, 
depicts it as one or some combination of three images: a satellite of the Soviet Union, a 
totalitarian regime, or a feudal dynasty.  This paper argues in contrast that it is best to explain 
North Korea’s political institution centered around Suryong as a product of the collective 
choice to pursue the often contradictory dual goals of building a “socialist utopia” and 
achieving economic development.  In pursuit of these goals, the Korean Workers’ Party 
(KWP) has adopted a collectivist developmental strategy that places a premium on collective 
efforts and non-material incentives.  Several problems arose in the process of implementation, 
and particularly serious were the challenges of de-Stalinism from outside and dogmatism 
from within as well as individualism among the public.  The KWP responded with political 
projects: to solidify the Party and strengthen its unity with the public while privileging 
ideological incentives over material rewards.  The series of choices has led to the 
establishment of the Suryong system where Kim Il-Sung occupies the central position of 
power around which the Party and mass are organized.  While the Suryong system faced 
particularly difficult challenges in the 1990s, Kim Jong-Il’s ‘Military-First Policies’ sought to 
institutionalize the system further by using the military to diffuse Suryong system’s 
normative values throughout the society.  This paper concludes by considering some of the 
negative consequences that the pursuit of such a strategy has brought about. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the conclusion of an article published in 1963, Glenn D. Paige argued that the 
“Communist politics in North Korea have been characterized by a degree of harshness which 
it is difficult for an outside(r) to understand…”1 Over forty years have passed since then and 
North Korea still remains a nation of mystery to outsiders.  And whether then or now, it is 
difficult to find any qualitative improvements, if there have been one made, in the 
expressions that describe North Korea.  Totalitarianism, satellite state and absolutist state 
etc… Today North Korea is referred to as the last remaining Stalinist regime on the face of 
the earth:  One party dictatorship, one ideology, fanatic loyalty to the leader and various 
apparatuses that insinuate into all aspects of the society. These features are comparable to 
those of Stalinist Soviet Union.     
 
            All these apparent traits qualify Friedrich and Brzezinski’s description of 
‘totalitarianism’.  However, is it possible to make classification of North Korea based on its 
skeletons?  As Alex Inkeles pointed out, the evaluation of a model is not whether the social 
model is right or wrong, but how rich or poor it is.2  If one pays heed to this argument, the 
totalitarian model only provides a partial explanation of North Korean society.  And these 
features that have been understood as totalitarian can be commonly found in any number of 
societies.  Furthermore, such can be seen more often in nations that are described as 
authoritarian.3  
 
 Since the 1950’s and the periods following détente, civil rights and other new social 
movements in US, the totalitarian model has come under heavy attacks.  However, with the 
revival of the Cold War during the Reagan-Thatcher era, the model was newly resurrected 
and merged with political and ideological purposes to evidently become further expanded 
and reproduced upon.4 
 
  And today, North Korea exists as a testament to the revitalized theory of 
totalitarianism.  As Kongdan Oh has simplistically and yet, compellingly drawn, the image of 
North Korea is that of Kim’s Dynasty agreed upon by the union of totalitarianism and 
Confucianism.5 Additionally, as it is revealing in the title of Adrian Buzo’s book, North 
Korea is merely a dynastic model of an Asiatic totalitarianism.6  In fact, the only one who has 
                                                 
1  Paige, Glenn D. & Lee, Dong Jun, 'The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea,' The China Quarterly No. 14 
(April June, 1963), p. 28. 
2   Inkeles, Alex, 'Models and Issues in the analysis of Soviet,' Survey 60 (July, 1966), p. 3. 
3  Fridriech and Brzezinski cites six features as being particular to totalitarianism:  Official ideology, single 
man’s        party, system of terror by police control, monopoly on communications system, state directed 
economy.   Friedrich, Carl J. and Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy (New York: 
Praeger, 1956), p. 31. However, such characteristics can be seen to differing degrees in all nation-states.  In 
particular, the monopoly on weapons is commonly found in most nations and in regards to the ideology and 
the one-party system, this is also evident in authoritarian states as well.  And as for the state directed economy, 
this is commonly prevalent in all socialist states.  
4  As for the history of totalitarianism see, Gleason, Abbott, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Ch. 7. 
 5  Take a look at Kongdan Oh’s work.  She predetermines North Korea as a dynasty that has been forged by 
totalitarianism and Confucianism.  Oh, Kongdan and Hassig, Ralph C., North Korea through the looking 
glass(Washington D.C: Brookings, 2002).  
6  Buzo, Adrian, The Guerilla Dynasty (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).  
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applied more social scientific understanding of totalitarianism to North Korea, so far is 
McCormack.  He describes North Korea as a neo-totalitarian state and even then, views 
North Korea as having deviated from the classical model of totalitarian state.7  
 
 As Edward Said has pointed out, the Orientalism of the West is verily evident in its 
taxonomical exercise.  Orientalistic views and analysis are applied not only towards the 
Orient of the West, but also towards all Others that are at its opposite.  The most critical 
problem of the Orientalistic view is in its refusal to recognize the cultural parity (cultural 
relativism) of others or in its dismissal of the history and the values of Other.  Such 
perception leads to the reproduction of knowledge in a fixed framework and the knowledge 
reproduced within reinforces the existing perception, thus creating a cycle of entrenchment.   
 
 Today in the West, particularly the perception of North Korea within the American 
academia is almost Orientalistic.8 To be more precise, it can be called ‘North Korean-ism’.  
Before ‘North Korean-ism’ can be validated as a theory, it must first be tested with historical 
and structural analysis of the present situation in North Korea.  
 
 This article is divided into two parts.  The first will provide an overview of the 
critical works on the Suryong system of North Korea in the Western academia and highlight 
the problems associated with each approach.  And the second will examine the North Korean 
Suryong system through the use of ‘developmental strategic’ methodology.  Through the 
‘developmental strategic’ analysis, the article will demonstrate how the Suryong system was 
formed during the process of implementing a collectivistic developmental strategy while 
carrying on the struggles against individualism and revisionism.  
 
2. The evaluation of North Korea’s Suryong political system in the West 
  
1) North Korea Studies in the US:  The entrapment of the Cold War 
 The view of North Korea within the Western academia, accumulated over the past 
fifty years, has still yet to be freed of the constraints of the Cold War.  The reason for this lies 
in North Korea never having invited much scholarly interests, but the other comes from the 
academia still being hampered by the restraints of the Cold-War ideologies.  Starting in the 
mid and the late 1980’s, the increased interest on North Korea has brought according output 
of works and yet, neither the boundaries of scholarly interests nor the quality of works have 
improved much.  In fact, the narrow scope of researches that are more often concentrated on 
the nuclear missiles issues of the 1990’s and the policy-directed researches have led to a 
decrease in the analyses of the history, the structure and the present situation of North Korea.  
This has led to policy formulation on North Korea that is want for accurate knowledge and 
reveals the biases and the paucity of critical examination based on few select information.  
When summarized, North Korean studies carried out so far is as follows:  
 
                                                 
7     McCormack, Gavan, 'Kim's Country: Hard Times in North Korea,' New Left Review, No. 198, March/April 1993.  
8   Such perception of the ‘problem’ that is North Korea is quite clearly shown in the problematization of North 
Korea. That is, the solution to the ‘problem’ (with North Korea) is not sought from the causes itself, but it is 
deduced from the very existence of North Korea.  Therefore, the solution has to derive from North Korea’s 
very system, as seen in the advocation of the regime ‘collapse’, ‘change’ or ‘negotiation’.  
  3
 
Table 1: The trend of North Korean studies in US 
 
Time period Researchers Research Topic Ideological Orientation 
Theoretical 
framework and 
Methodologies 
Sources 
Cold war 
(’50-’60) 
Dept. of State, 
CIA, Dept. of 
Defense 
Satellite state, 
Power struggle 
 
Anti-Communism 
Anti-Sovietism 
Sovietism 
Totalitarianism 
CIA briefings 
Newspaper 
Détente 
(’70) 
R. Scalapino, 
Chongsik Lee, 
Daesuk Suh, Glen 
D. Paige, etc. 
North’s policy toward 
South, North’s power 
structure, The history 
of Korean communism, 
Kim, Il Sung, etc. 
Anti-Communism 
Revisionism(the 
leftist intellectuals)
Totalitarianism 
Confucianism 
Partial primary 
sources, 
Nodong sinmun 
(newspaper of 
Korean Worker’s 
Party), etc. 
New Cold 
war 
(’80) 
B. Cumings, G. 
McCormack and 
Revisionist(Hallida
y, Allen Brun, 
Martin-Hart 
Landsberg), etc. 
North Korean system,
North-South 
relationships, 
North Korean 
economic line/model, 
Suryong political 
system, Juche 
Ideology, etc. 
Anti-Communism 
Revisionism 
Totalitarianism 
Confucianism 
Marxist Theory 
Govt. documents,
newspaper 
primary sources 
witness 
testimonies(travel 
accounts) 
Post-Cold 
war 
(’90 - 
present) 
Kongdan Oh, N. 
Eberstadt, M. 
Noland, Victor 
Cha, Samuel Kim, 
C. Amstrong, etc 
North Korean regime 
collapse, North’s 
Reform and Open, 
Unification of North-
South, Nuclear and 
Missile issues 
Anti-Communism 
Liberal Democracy
Totalitarianism 
Confucianism 
Reform and Open 
Theory 
Defector’s 
testimonies 
newspaper 
primary sources 
travel accounts 
 
                   What is evident in the above <table 1> is in US how many of the early studies on 
North Korea were conducted by governmental institutions and how their contents were 
tailored to the themes of power struggles of North Korea and North Korea’s characteristic as 
a satellite state.  In the 1980’s, there have been more researchers and perspectives became 
diversified as to range from the existing totalitarian approaches to the revisionisms of the 
Left theorists.  Also, their (the revisionists) introduction to South Korea has been met with an 
outpouring of responses.  
However, since the end of the Cold War, although the studies of North Korea in US have 
quantitatively increased, qualitative wise, the scholarship has suffered stagnation.  The reason 
for this lies in the shift that has occurred since the end of the Cold War, where the studies on 
North Korea have moved from being an academic discipline to that of policy making with 
researches primarily focused on nuclear and missile issues.9  
  
 Number of reasons, such as language and sources can be cited as underlying factors 
for stagnation of North Korean studies in US, but more immediately, this has to do with the 
fact that within the discipline, the majority of researches on North Korea are based on 
contempt and hostility towards the regime.  Furthermore, it is not only the paucity of sources 
                                                 
9   In much of the works produced in South Korea after the Cold War, themes of regime collapse, reform and 
opening up of North Korea were dominant.  However, by the end of the 1990’s, these works have been 
criticized for their overt projection of subjective optimism. 
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that needs to be addressed but more so than this, it is the deficiency in the interpretational 
skills of the sources that has yet to be improved.   If one were to analyze the current reception 
and analytical methodologies used in US, one can find following characteristics.  
 
 First, much of the studies on North Korea in US are replete with hostility and 
contempt.  Works of Kongdan Oh, Victor Cha and Eberstadt can be cited as such examples.  
In particular, Eberstadt’s analysis of North Korea’s politics, economy and society, his 
empirical analysis in particular, despite having derived from the North Korean demographic 
studies, regrettably abound in contempt. 10 As Hazel Smith has argued, North Korea that is 
perceived is not only a ‘mad’ actor but a ‘bad’ one as well.11  However, as Smith has pointed 
out, the two cannot coexist, since in terms of ‘rationality’, a ‘mad’ actor cannot be rational, 
but a ‘bad’ actor can be one.  
 
 If this is so, then where lays the origin of such self-contradiction?  Mainly, this is 
traced to the remnants of the Cold War hostilities that have yet to be cleared up.  Another 
(cause) is the historical memory of having aimed guns at each other and waging wars.  
However, the more considerable (factor) is North Korea posing strong challenges to the 
interests of United States. As a result, the perception of North Korea has yet to be freed from 
the ‘security paradigm’ 12 and consequently, their perception still remains ensnared in ‘the 
trap of the Cold War’.  
  
 Second, in regards to methodologies of North Korean studies, scarcity of source 
materials and an excess of theoretical determinisms are evident.  The American academia is 
in possession of extensive materials and theoretical accumulations accrued on Soviet Union 
and China.  And also, these works carried out by American scholars during the Cold War 
were responsible for their success in the theoretical confrontations with Soviet Union and 
other socialist blocs.  And yet, in research and in analysis of North Korea, it is hard to find 
such assiduity.  In fact, recent studies on North Korea have been marked by its usage of 
unfounded testimonies of North Korean defectors, poor source materials that are mainly 
derived from newspaper and magazine articles and an overt dependence of secondary 
sources.13  
 
 Also, although this is research on North Korea, it is rare to see the use of materials 
from North Korea.  This reveals a startling truth about the discipline: despite being an area 
                                                 
10  Eberstadt, Nicholas & Banister, Judith, Population of North Korea (Berkeley, California: University of 
california Press, 1992); Eberstadt, 'The Old North' The World & I, Vol. 15(2000). 
11  Smith, Hazel, 'Bad, mad, sad and rational actor? Why the 'secrutization' Paradigm makes for poor policy 
analysis of north Korea,' International Affairs 76, 1(2002). 
12  Smith, op cit. 
13  (U.S Dept. of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2004, released on Sept. 15, 2004). Currently, 
there are not too many infrequent hearings of North Korean defectors being held in US.  The problem lies in 
the publicizing of these testimonies without much verifications done in the first place.  This is incurring 
much backlash from some members of the defectors community.  In the State Department’s International 
Religious Freedom Report for 2004, there are uncorroborated and incredible accounts of biological 
experiments conducted on Christians who have refused to accept Juche ideology.  Many defectors express 
strong criticisms towards the use of questionable testimonies given by few defectors.  In South Korea, 
although the defector testimonies are treated as important source materials, efforts are taken to ensure its 
veracity.  
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study, the scholarship hardly makes use of primary materials from the given area.  In addition 
to this, what is also visible is the attempt to compensate the lack of primary sources with 
theoretical observations.  In particular, this excess of theoretical determinism, rather than 
utilizing concepts such as totalitarianism, Confucianism and autocracy as conclusions 
derived from the analysis of the historical and the structural trends of North Korea, by 
assigning (these concepts) a priori, creates further gap in comprehension.   
 
 This is a violence committed in the name of theory.  Such theoretical violence 
produces the perception of the validity of selective collection of information and of only 
materials pertinent to theory as having value.14 However, materials alone cannot substitute 
analysis.  Perhaps it is easier to wield violence onto one that is the target of one’s enmity and 
hostility.  
 
 As shown above, the study of North Korea in US, is not carried out as philosophical, 
historical or structural inquiry of the ‘North Korean phenomenon’, but is dominated by 
formalized theories and a priori definitions.  As Armstrong has argued, “a researcher of a 
given area must thoroughly be aware of the concepts in its totality.”15 However, the current 
state of North Korean studies in US sees North Korea as an Other to be observed and a 
poorly conceptualized totality.  As a result, North Korea is defined based on a priori 
assumptions and exists only in so far as it can be perceived through the prisms of the Cold 
War.    
 
2) North Korea as viewed in the States:  Three Images of North Korea  
 
The satellite state theory 
 In his book, Adrian Buzo establishes several concepts to compare Stalinist system 
and North Korea and based on this, argues that North Korea’s dominant sphere of state 
activities – for examples, politics, leadership, ideology, economy and social mobilizations etc 
– cannot be understood without the blueprint provided by Stalinism.16  For him, North Korea 
can only be comprehended with Stalinism as its barometer.  And from this, the image of 
North Korea that comes across is a transplanted Stalinist regime as well as a satellite state.  
The origin of North Korea as seen from the West is that of a mere puppet of Soviet Union.  
Labeled a ‘dummy’, North Korea began as a transplanted Soviet revolution and took off as a 
copycat of Stalinist system.  This is clear in the American researches of the past, where they 
have almost unilaterally depicted North Korea as a ‘satellite’ state.17 This is situating North 
                                                 
14  Many materials that use testimonies of those who had lived under the regime attest to this.  In Helen-Louise 
Hunter’s work, one can see selective usage of records that cannot be easily interpreted according to 
American values and testimonies of defectors that are highly biased and as for Kongdan Oh, only subjective 
evaluation has value.  For Bruce Cumings’ example of Kang Cholhwan, it is the ‘fact’ of Kang’s return to 
the normal community despite having lived in the labour camp rather than the living condition inside labour 
camp itself that merits attention.  This poses a contrast to the above.   
15  Amstrong, Charles K., 'An Interview with Gari Ledyard,' The Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003, 
pp. 143-185.  
16  Buzo, op cit. p. 43. 
17  Up until the 1960’s, this attitude was quite dominant.  The State Department publications during the Korean 
War and in materials that were later re-edited North Korea is defined as a satellite state of Soviet Union.  
Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite, Report of the Department of State 
Research Mission to Korea, Office of Intelligence research Report N0. 5600, May 20, 1951 (Reprinted by 
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Korea in the same relationship as that of between Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries.  As a satellite state, North Korea in its usage of Stalinist ideology, developmental 
lines and idolization of its supreme leader, is in fact a small Stalinist state.18 However as seen 
from the historical process of North Korea since ’1950s particularly around the development 
of Suryong system and Juche ideology, North Korea has developed its own political and 
structural system different from just a small Stalinist state. 
 
 Much of the ignorance of the American academia, as seen in the assignation of North 
Korea as a satellite state of the Soviet Union derives from their lack of understanding of the 
history of North Korea.  Scholars such as Daesuk Suh, Chong-Sik Lee and Scalapino have 
already done much historical examinations of North Korea and Kim Il Sung and have shown 
the long history of the communist movements in Korea.19  
 
 The ideology of North Korean communist leadership, as the history of the Third 
World national liberations testify to, is very deeply rooted in anti-imperialism and 
nationalism. 20  Charles Armstrong, in his research on the construction of culture of North 
Korea has shown how even from the earliest period, North Korean cultural formation 
possessed much autonomous nationalistic traits. 21  
 
 Evaluating North Korea as a transplanted Stalinist system and a satellite state is the 
result of rather mechanistic application of Cold War factions headed by US and Soviet Union 
since the end of the WWII. 22  As the later history of North Korea shows, the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, changes within the international communist bloc and the consolidation of Juche 
ideology transformed relations within these nations.  Although it is quite clear that North 
Korea in its foundational stage, during Korean War and in later developmental phase 
                                                                                                                                                       
Government Printing Office, 1961) 
18  Although differing from this, similar traits can also be found in Chalmers Johnson’s work.  He sees South 
Korea as a successful satellite state of US and North Korea as a satellite of Soviet Union. Johnson, Chalmers, 
Blow Back (New York, NY: Henry holt & Co.: 2000); Also, the satellite theory is linked to the argument of 
Kim’s acquisition of power made possible with the aid from the top, the Soviet Union.  And a more 
preposterously expanded claim made from this argument is the ‘stooge theory’.  The ‘stooge’ theory was 
propagated as core anti-North Korean ideology in the 1960’s – 70’s that coincided with the rise of Park 
Chung Hee’s military dictatorship.  Yi Yongmyong and Huh Dongchan are the most famous proponents of 
this argument.  Yi, Yongmyong, Kim Il-sung Yoljon  (Seoul: Sinmunhwasa, 1974), Ho, Dongchan, Kim Il-
sung Pyongjon (Seoul: Pukhan Yonkuso, 1987).  Daesuk Suh’s works in the 1980’s have done much to 
overturn the ‘stooge theory’.  Daesuk Suh has shown that although Kim had less than an illustrious career as 
anti-Japanese guerilla that is depicted by North Korea today, he had in fact, been active as anti-Japanese 
guerilla in Manchuria.  Suh, Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1988).   
19  Suh, Dae-Sook, ibid.; Scalapino, Robert A. & Lee, Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California, 1972).  Their works have become much focus of criticisms today.   Although they have done 
much for early studies on North Korea, since the 1980’s, many works produced in South Korea have taken 
further steps.  
20 As for North Korea’s first generation of revolutionaries, in particular the historical treatment of Kim Il Sung’s 
nationalistic views, see Han, Hong-koo, ‘Wounded Nationalism: The Minsaengdan Incident and Kim Il 
Sung in Eastern Manchuria,’ Ph D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1999.  
21 Charles Armstrong, ‘The Formation of North Korean Culture: 1945-1950’ Hyondae Pukhan Yonku, vol.2 
issue 1, 1999 
22 As for the historical process of seeing North Korea as either ‘puppet state’ or ‘satellite state’ see, Chong Yong 
Wook’s presentation.   
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received massive aid from Soviet Union and support from China, for these Korean 
communists, what was more important was the struggle to establish their ‘Juche’.  For them, 
Juche meant an ‘independency’ from outside and signified being ‘masters’ of their own 
fate.23  Furthermore, ‘Juche’ was not only anti-foreign, but also included loyalty to the 
‘minjok’ (nation).24  In his speech given in 1955, Kim Il Sung shows very clearly how he and 
others define Juche: 
  
 What is Juche in our ideological efforts of the party?  What are we doing?  
We are not waging revolutions of any other nations, but that of the Korean 
Revolution.  This Korean Revolution is the Juche of our ideological efforts of the 
party.  Therefore, all ideological efforts must become subservient to the good of the 
Korean Revolution.25  
 
 The establishment of the Juche conveyed independency from socialisms of Soviet 
Union and China as well as imperialism of US and heralded self-determination of their own 
fate and action.  Such beginnings of ‘Juche’, according to North Korea has long history, but 
the most immediate reason lay in the internal conflicts within North Korea, the Sino-Soviet 
tensions and the power struggles surrounding the development of socialism in North Korea 
from the 1950’s.26  Taken from this view, the depiction of North Korea as a ‘satellite’ or as a 
transplanted system of Soviet Union is a typical static view of history that renders the early 
formation process as an absolute.    
 
 Such static view of history faced a serious challenge in 1968.  This was none other 
than the SS Pueblo Incident. In the aftermath of the crisis, Johnson in his speech (Dec. 22nd 
1968) recalled that North Korea seems to be a nation out of the pressure of the U.S.S.R.27 
During their attempts to solve the crisis, the Johnson administration came to realize that 
despite their heavy pressure bearing upon the Soviet Union, North Korea did not follow the 
orders of the Soviet Union.  Also, Kosikin the premier of USSR at the time, at the request of 
Johnson, repeatedly made demands for the return of the captives but was refused.  V. 
                                                 
23 Selig Harrison defines North Korea’s Juche as either ‘self-reliance’ or ‘independence’.  Bruce Cumings see it 
as “DPRK as having primacy over all else in all matters that are related to DPRK”. Harrison, Selig S., 
Korean Endgame (Princeton: princeton Univ. Press, 2002); Cumings, Bruce, 'The Corporate State in North 
Korea,' Koo, Hagen (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993), p. 
213.    
24 Park, Han Sik, 'The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology,' Park, Han S.(ed.), North Korea: Ideology, 
Politics, Economy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1996), p. 12.  
25 Kim Il Sung, ‘Sasang saop eseo kyojojuui wa hyongsikjuui rul toechi haggo juche rul hwakrip hal ttae 
taehayo (To combat doctrinism and formalism in our ideological efforts and to establish Juche)’ Kim Il Sung 
Chojakjip 9 [Writings of Kim Il Sung] (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa, 1980), p. 467.  Such 
statement can be seen as continuous of his earlier speeches from the 1930’s when he was involved in anti-
Japanese guerilla work.  “The master of the Korean Revolution are none other than Korean people 
themselves, the Korean Revolution must be carried out by the efforts of the Korean people alone, carrying it 
out in ways befitting to our reality and possessing resolute stance and attitude on this, I concede it is most 
important.”  Kim Il Sung, ‘Choson Hyokmyong ui chinro (The path of the Korean Revolution (1930.6),’  
Kim Il Sung Chojakjip, vol. 1, 1979, p.5  
26 More specifically, this is from Kim Il Sung’s speech given in 1955 titled, ‘Sasang saop eseo kyojojuui wa 
kyongsikjuui rul toechi haggo juche rul hawkrip halt tae taehayo’ [To combat doctrinism and formalism in 
our ideological efforts and to establish Juche]  
27 Johnson’s speech 
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Tkachenko, who was in charge of North Korean affairs at the Ministry of International 
Affairs testified that for a long time, North Korea had exercised the independent initiative. 28 
In fact, what this revealed was how even the Soviet Union was already refuting the notion of 
North Korea as a satellite state.  By the 1960’s, the argument of North Korea as a 
transplanted system of Soviet Union and a satellite state was becoming obsolete.  
  
Power and Succession:  Suryong political system as an absolutist system 
 The most common evaluation of North Korea made in the West is that of an 
absolutist system that has been merged out of totalitarianism and absolutism.  And such 
evaluation finds support in two phenomena.  One is the cult or the idolization of the supreme 
leader Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the other is the hereditary succession of power.  In 
fact, for outsiders, the idolization and the hereditary succession cannot easily be 
comprehended and makes North Korea appear as an ‘exceptional’ state or an ‘abnormal’ 
state.   
 
 Generally, the Suryong political system is interpreted as a pursuit of absolute power 
by the individual and hereditary succession of power is understood as Kim’s decision to not 
to repeat the experiences of the socialist states, in particular, the history following the death 
of Stalin and Khrushchev’s attack on the Stalinist regime.  In fact, for many theorists of the 
Left, their initial sympathies waned after the formation of the Suryong system and with the 
establishment of hereditary succession of power.   
 
 From the viewpoint of democracy, Suryong system is a feudal and an anti-
democratic case.  As if to prove it, in 1997, Hwang Jang Yop who defected to South Korea 
defined North Korea as ‘a feudal absolutist monarchy’ and denied North Korea as being a 
socialist state.29  In fact, the Suryong system of North Korea is contrary to the orthodox of 
the ‘Party-State System’.  The Suryong system can be categorized as a ‘party upon party’ 
political system and it has come under attack for this very reason of power transference from 
father to son.  
  
 However, such criticisms of the Suryong system and the power inheritance dismiss 
(the need for) structural comprehension of the Suryong system and the historical formation of 
power inheritance.  In particular, these (criticisms) are mainly concentrated on the succession 
of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il.  Generally, inheritance denotes a systemization or 
a purposeful display of power authority based on bloodlines.  Seen from this perspective, the 
lack of structural and historical analysis of power inheritance and its topical problematization 
is quite common in US academia.  In fact, the inheritance of power can be found in many 
nations, including democratic capitalist systems.  Most recently in Syria, power was 
transferred from the father to the son, and this was similarly found to be the case in Taiwan 
and Singapore.  Even if one were to exclude the Nehru-Gandhi family, in Japan as well as in 
US and in Europe, there have been cases of influential politicians with backgrounds as 
members of established great families.  This shows that the handing down of power cannot 
be simply explained as remaining traces of an Asiatic patriarchy, and on the flip side, the 
                                                 
28 Hankyoreh sinmun [Hankyoreh Dialy Newpaper], Oct. 19th, 1993 
29  Hwang Jang Yop, Nanun, yoksaui chinrireul poatta [I have seen the truth of history] (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 
1999) 
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power inheritance from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il can be understood as being parallel to 
that of political practices found in other nations.  
 
 Until now, the power inheritance of North Korea has been understood from two 
perspectives.  One was to understand it from ideo-cultural perspective where undemocratic 
nature of power inheritance is derived from East Asian Confucianism. The other is to see this 
from a power-centered perspective, where the situation in North Korea is solely understood 
in terms of Kim Il Sung’s will to power.  
 
 The most vocal proponent of the former view where North Korea is the merger of 
21st century totalitarianism and Confucian monarchy is Kongdan Oh.  She argues that Kim 
Jong Il succeeded his father despite lacking leadership capabilities.30 The key here is 
Confucian patriarchy.  As an example of father-son succession, McCormack cites the 
example of Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo of China and Taiwan, but he insists 
although they represent nationalist state and ideology, they were its representatives rather 
than nation building actors and singles out North Korea as an unusual case not to be found 
anywhere else.  31  
 
 For him, North Korea is neither democratic nor republican, but of an absolutist 
monarchical system.32  It is almost a modern version of ‘l’Etat, c’est moi’.  Such perception 
of seeing power succession in North Korea as Confucian and patriarchal system not only 
emphasizes the Asiatic peculiarities, but also shows another facet of Orientalistic tendencies.  
This demonstrates ideological bias as well as deficiency of analysis that places an overt 
reliance on cultural explications.   
  
 Another approach, the power-centered perspective analyzes the Suryong system and 
the inheritance issue on the basis of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s will to power.  That is to 
argue that the end result came about due to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s pursuit of 
autocratic authority.  The events that took place after the deaths of Stalin and Mao Zedong 
fostered fear of collapse of the autocratic regime in the event of Kim’s death.  And Kim Il 
Sung, the argument explains, in order to secure his posterity, sought autocratic authority and 
focused on the transference of power to his son.   
 
 Such argument is a step further taken in that it emphasizes the problem of succession 
in the bloc and its parallel effect on North Korea.  However, such explanation ignores the 
diversity of succession problems among the socialist countries and Kim’s power 
consolidation process as well as the formation of succession system as well.  Furthermore, 
considering the fact that succession procedure was not created by Kim Il Sung’s individual 
                                                 
30  Oh, Kongdan, op. cit. p. 9, 102.  As for the lack of Kim Jong-il’s leadership, she points to charisma as well as 
his avoidance of the public.  She argues that Kim Jong Il’s leadership was only possible because of his 
father’s reputation and as such, she sees Kim less as a charismatic leader but as a transactional leader.  From 
such conclusion, she argues that although the North Korean elites do not show respect and loyalty to Kim 
Jong Il, the support has been possible through Kim Jong Il’s offering of carrot and whip.  Unfortunately, no 
evidence are cited (in the work) to support her arguments.  
31  McCormack, Target North Korea (New York: Nation Books, 2004), p. 52. 
32  McCormack(2004), Ibid. p. 51. 
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will alone, this also shows complete ignorance of the issues of succession.33 Like Kongdan 
Oh or McCormack’s arguments, for North Korea that has been defined either as dynasty or as 
monarchy, the will of the supreme leader is the sole variable for explication.  However, even 
if one were to accept that Kim Il Sung’s glory had critical bearing on Kim Jong Il’s securing 
of power, what needs to be equally taken into consideration is Kim Jong Il’s own power 
consolidation process.  Many of the criticisms of power inheritance ignore this point.  In fact, 
the crucial weakness of the power-centered perspective lies not so much in the lack of macro-
analysis of social development, but the neglect of the dynamics of North Korean society with 
its singular focus on power.  Such view can also be found in Bruce Cumings as well.34  
 
 In fact, defining North Korea as a familial state or assuming the patriarchal 
inheritance to be comprehensible within the bounds of Korean Confucian tradition, one 
overlooks facts such as Kim Jong Il’s leadership capabilities and his growth into a leader and 
also of North Korea’s own dilemma regarding this patrilineal inheritance.  As Vladmir 
Tikhonov points out, such argument maybe palatable to the American readership but this 
altogether misses the reality.35  The history and the reality surrounding the power inheritance 
recedes into the background and only its cultural characteristics become emphasized.  If one 
were to recognize the importance of the influence of Confucian culture on North Korea, the 
importance of the reality faced by North Korea needs to be recognized as well.  
 
The cult of the individual and idolization:  lessons from history 
 To outsiders, what makes North Korea appear quite strange is its cult and the 
idolization of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.  For many who have visited Pyongyang, the city 
appears as if awash in statues and portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.  And with this 
image of the exotic scenery, one easily overlooks the pragmatic, the symbolic and the 
functional significance of such objects and deems the entire society to be totalitarian system 
replete with the cult of the individual.   In fact, the cult of the leader in North Korea is 
described as comparable to that of Stalin or Mao or as even surpassing them.  With more than 
30, 000 statues and other paraphernalia of Kim Il Sung gracing the nation, this bespeaks the 
autocratic nature of the Suryong system. As Byung Chul Koh has rightly pointed out, for the 
outside observers, it is the cult of Kim Il Sung that comprises the most important feature of 
North Korea.36 
 
 The cult of Kim Il Sung began with the appearance of Kim Jong Il in the 1960’s.  
With the purge of  ‘The August Faction Incident’ ending in Kim Il Sung’s consolidation of 
power, the cult earned a parallel status with ‘Juche’ and with Kim Jong Il’s arrival, became 
                                                 
33  The ones who had critical influence in the selection of Kim Jong Il as the successor was not Kim Il Sung, but 
his colleagues from the anti-Japanese guerrilla days.  They convinced Kim who was not as sure to appoint 
Kim Jong Il as the successor. For more on the selection of Kim Jong Il as the successor and its processes, see 
Chung, Young Chul, ‘Kim Jon Il Cheje Seongripui SahoeJungchijeok Kiwon’ [The Social and Political 
Origins of Kim Jong-Il’s Regime in North Korea], Ph.D dissertation. Seoul National University, 2001.  
34  Cumings, Bruce, North Korea: Another Country(New York: New Press, 2004), ch. 4; Amstrong, Charles, 
'The Myth of North Korea,' Cumings (ed.), Chicago Ocassional Papers on Korea, Selected Papers Vol. 6, 
The Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, 1991.  
35 Vladmir Tikhonov, Hayan kamyon ui cheguk [Empire of White Mask] (Seoul: Hakyoreh sinmunsa, 2003) 
36 Hunter, Helen-Louise, Kim Il-Sung’s North Korea (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1999), Nam Seong Wook, 
trans. [CIA: Report on North Korea] (Seoul: Hansong, 2000) p. 49 re-cited. 
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an official discourse.  The cult was carried out in several ways, beginning with the usage of 
symbolic languages (ex. Kim’s titles) in the cult.  Examples of this can be found in the long 
honorifics and titles that are bestowed upon Kim Il Sung’s name when addressing him37 
 
 The second was in the usage of spatial symbols (such as in the installation of statues 
and the designation of his old battlefields and his birthplace as historical sites).  The 
archetypical examples are the massive statue of Kim Il Sung which proudly occupies the 
center of the city of Pyongyang and the historical sites and the monuments related to him that 
are placed throughout the nation. Such representations foster an illusion of Kim Il Sung being 
everywhere and also functions to create his paternal love and to feel his presence as 
intimately as possible.38  And these monuments that are placed, in turn become expressions 
of love and loyalty towards Kim Il Sung.  It is placed as if to always feel father’s love and his 
presence.39  
 
 The cult of Kim Il Sung is criticized as a quasi-religious state and a method of 
brainwashing for the people of North Korea.40  Andrew Holloway argues that the cult of Kim 
Il Sung has two purposes, one being the inculcation of absolute loyalty to the leadership and 
unifying people through common belief and the other being loyalty as well as learning to 
follow the example of the leadership. 41  
 
 What is quite clear is that the cult of Kim Il Sung had close ties with the culture of 
the Confucian tradition.42 In particular, Bruce Cumings points out that both North and South 
Korea seem to have tradition of reverence towards the leadership or their scriptures.43 
However, as much as tradition may be of a factor, one must understand that there were 
                                                 
37  According to Choson chonsa [The General History of Choson], in the early modern history of North Korea, 
“under the wise guidance of the glorious party center, many new words and expressions were created in our 
language.  Most of all, many polite expressions designated for expressing the greatness of our supreme 
leader were created and entered our everyday language of the people” Choson chonsa (Pyongyang: 
Kwahakpaekkwasajon chulpansa, 1982), p. 330.  
38 As for an excellent work that examines the North Korean political situation (Kim as supreme leader/ Kim Il 
Sung and the Suryong system) from the perspective of East Asian culture, the image of the patriarch within 
the Confucian tradition of family and the following North Korean political state, see Charles Armstrong 
(1991). 
39  Kim Il Sung’s statues, starting with the massive statue of Kim in Pyongyang, are in every regions. The statue 
is not simply a monument, but Kim’s alter living presence. Byung Chul Koh writes in his travelogue that 
“…literally Kim Il Sung exists everywhere.” Hunter, op. cit. p. 49.  
40  One American website list Juche ideology as the world’s 10th largest religion. According to this website, 
North Korea’s Juche ideology is a religion that has 1.9 million practitioners. (http://www.adherents.com – 
Nov. 4th, 2004 search).  
41 Holloway, Andrew, 'A Year In Pyonyang'(http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyonyang_3.htm - Oct. 25th, 
2004 search).  The two objectives that he had observed were what the leadership had most struggled with in 
their attempts to seek solutions to the current problems. In short, they had portrayed the collective as an 
alterative response towards the emergent individualism and Suryong as the completed human being of an 
utopian society, and as a form of political expression for this, established the Suryong political system.  
42  Bruce Cumings and Armstrong locate the origin of North Korea’s cult of the leadership within the East Asian 
Confucian tradition. However, by examining such cultural tradition in the context of its significance in North 
Korea’s early modern history, they avoid the pitfalls of the cultural deterministic theories. Selig Harrison 
also argues that if North Korea’s political system were to be categorized in the tradition of Western political 
science, the corporatist model as argued by Cumings, would be the most appropriate one to apply. 
43  Cumings, Bruce, 'Kim's Korean Communism,' Problem of Communism, March-April, 1974, p. 34. 
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political developments that occurred during the formation of the socialist state and also as 
well, concurrent efforts taken to solve immediate problems.  The demand for the 
establishment of Juche in North Korea included resistance towards the dogma of formalized 
Marxist-Leninism and the revisionist trends within the system.44  
 
 During this process, North Korea began to see its leadership as a popular living 
embodiment of the changes for the good of the majority and demanded that it (leadership) 
became one.  Meaning, rather than a cult, they defined Kim Il Sung’s leadership as a 
leadership personified.  The coinciding of the increasing visibility of the cult with the rising 
demand for the establishment of Juche ideology was for this very reason.  And the 
symbolization, coming to possess affinity with Confucian tradition, achieved success without 
much opposition.   
 
 In particular, the totalization of the personified leadership of Kim Il Sung, with the 
historical charisma and his popularity shown in the post-liberation period, and the demands 
for strong leadership as means to end factional struggles, almost naturally became an object 
of worship.  Certainly, during this process, the extremities of the cult showed the negative 
end results of its dysfunctions.  According to McCormack, the cult of the leader was even 
contrary to the ‘Juche’ ideology as well, since it had negative effects on the creative role of 
the masses. 45  Koon Woo Nam, in his long-time study of the political situation of North 
Korea in the 1970’s, expresses his assessment as follows: 
 
 With the intensification of the factionalism, there was fierce and bloody 
competition, with loyalty to the factions overriding loyalty to the party, the 
concentration of struggles made members of the factions to become distanced from 
social issues and rendered them blind to the external threats that they had been facing 
from the beginning and to the end of the Korean War.   If such serious factionalism 
pervaded society and if North Korea were to experience further sufferings as a result 
of continued with political instability and social chaos, all this would undermine 
North Korea’s economic growth as a socialist state…Therefore, the emergence of a 
strong leader to govern North Korea was of necessity for national survival, for North 
Korea as a communist state. 46  
 
 In the end, the cult of Kim Il Sung has risen from the need for strong leadership, the 
demand for the establishment of Juche ideology and its affinity with cultural tradition.  And 
the cult that had thus begun became progressively extreme with the establishment of 
‘Suryong political system’ in 1967 and came to be appointed as the supremest value by Kim 
Jong Il.  However, sidestepping the assessment of its positivity or negativity, the startling 
outpouring of grief shown North Korea following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 
                                                 
44  North Korea traces the origin of the Juche ideology in the resistance and the struggle against toadyism and 
opposition towards formalism. Kim, Jong Il, ‘Juche sasang e taehayo’ Kim Jong Il sonjip 6[Selected 
Writings of Kim Jong Il] (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa, 1996)  
45 McCormack, Gavan, 'North Korea: Kimilsungism - Path to Socialism,' Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 
Vol. 13, No. 4. 1981, p. 54.  
46 Nam, Koon Woo, The North Korean Communist Leadership (1945-1965) (Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1974), pp. 141-142.   
  13
demonstrates the veracity of the cult.47  
 The North Korean situation mentioned above is an important theoretical proof in 
classifying North Korea as a totalitarian state.  Today, it is not easy to find a society where 
one leadership and unitary ideology dominates the whole entire society like North Korea. For 
this reason, North Korea does fit into the totalitarianism that Shapiro has described. 
Furthermore, as O’Hanlon has pointed out, it is partially true that as a ‘Hermit Kingdom’ 
North Korea resembles Soviet Union under Stalin and China under Mao Zedong.48  
 
 Also, the argument of an autocracy and a patriarchal state merged with Confucian 
tradition provide partial explication. However, problem with this explanation lies in the fact 
that the conceptualization of North Korea as a totalitarian, Confucian, autocratic society fails 
to show the fundamental characteristics of North Korea society. There is a wider gulf that 
exists between the problem of categorization of North Korea and seeing North Korea 
realistically with the use of historical and structural analysis.   
 
 The attempt to seek better understanding of North Korea’s Suryong system as a 
political system must be sought from the collective developmental strategies that they 
pursued. I will argue this as a ‘developmental strategic approach’.49 In specific, the Suryong 
political system was chosen as the political system to materialize the utopian ideal in 
response to North Korea’s political development and the structural problem. As Lowenthal 
pointed out, after the revolutions, the socialist nations faced serious dilemmas over the 
construction of their political ideal, the utopian society and the immediate task of economic 
reconstruction.50 And in order to resolve this dilemma, they sought various methods.   
 
 In so doing, they experienced political, ideological and economic changes.  Some, as 
in the case of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe went through transitional periods and the 
others like China, underwent evolutionary shift from left to right.  The problem of the US 
academia is that their analysis of North Korean totalitarianism rarely comes from systematic 
treatment of the contemporary problems that North Korea faced and also in liberal applying 
predetermined totalitarian ideology to North Korea.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Hunter, op. cit. 257.  According to Hunter, although there is no need to do so, the North Korean defectors still 
maintain their practice of the cult of the Kim. p. 52.  
48 O'Hanlon, Michael E. & Mocizuki, Mike M., Crisis on the Korean Peninsula (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2003), Ch. 1. 
49 For an excellent analysis, see Yi, Tae Sop, ‘Pukhan ui chiptanjuui chok palcho chonryak kwa suryongchegye 
ui hwakrip’ [The Collectivist Developmental Strategy and the Establishment of the ‘Suryong System’ in 
North Korea, 1956-1967], Ph.D dissertation, Seoul National University, 2001. Also, as a reaction against the 
discussion of totalitarianism, the works edited by Chalmers Johnson analyzes the socialist political situations 
from the development theory point of view. Johnson, Chalmers (ed.), Change in communist system 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Univ, Press, 1970).  
50 Lowenthal, Richard, 'Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,’ Johnson, Chalmers (ed.), Ibid.  
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3. A New Analysis of the Suryong System as a Political System in North Korea 
 
1) Challenge towards the power-centered perspective:  The Approaches of the 
Developmental Strategy  
 To challenge the power-centered perspective on Suryong system, I’m going to 
borrow the approaches of developmental strategy. That is North Korea’s Suryong system was 
developed through its struggle against the historical, political, economical problems in-and-
out of North Korea. 
 
 The discussions of North Korea’s Suryong system as a political system have been 
carried out by McCormack (neo-totalitarianism),51 Bruce Cumings (socialist corporatism),52 
Wada Haruki (guerrilla state, regular army state)53 and Suzuki Masayuki (Suryong 
socialism).54  Among these (works), if McCormack sees North Korea as having deviated 
from the totalitarian model, Bruce Cuming traces the social structure of North Korea as 
concentric and as a familial state centered on a patriarchal relationship with the peoples of 
the nation.  In contrast to this, Wada Haruki sees North Korea as a guerilla state where Kim Il 
Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla experience have been reformulated as the governing principles 
of social organization.  Recently, he has argued that the guerrilla state represented by Kim Il 
Sung has been changed to the regular army state of Kim Jong Il.  Suzuki Masayuki sees 
North Korea’s Suryong system as a symbiotic existence of socialism and Confucian tradition.  
 
 What is common in all these theories is that they all cite the particularistic of North 
Korea to be one of organizational unity and the unique social relationship between the 
Suryong and the mass.  In comparison to this, Charles Armstrong, instead of seeing the 
nature of North Korean society through one definition, examines it over various periods.  
According to him, North Korea is the most successful model of the indigenization of 
Stalinism and is unique in its own.  Also, the system has been formed as a result of historical 
process.55   
 
 As such, the reason for the diverse spectrum of views on North Korea’s political 
system has to do with the particularity of North Korea, which cannot be easily understood 
under current existing political theories.  And the specifics of the organizational principles 
and the managerial theories of North Korean society still have not been clearly identified.56  
As mentioned above, these specific explanatory models of North Korea’s Suryong-political 
                                                 
51 McCormack(1993), op. cit. 
52 Cumings, Bruce, 'Corporatism in North Korea,' Journal of Korean Studies 4(1982/1983). 
53 Wada, Haruki, (Lee Chong Suk trans.), Kim Il Sung kwa manju hangil chonjaeng [Kim Il Sung and Anti-
Japanese Wars in Manchuria] (Seoul: ChangjakkwaPipyong, 1992); Haruki, Wada, 'The Structure and 
Political Culture of the Kim Jong Il Regime: Its Novelty and Difficulties,' Park, Jae Kyu (ed.), North Korea in 
Transition and policy Choice: Domestic Structure and External Relations (Seoul: Kyungnam Univ. Press, 
1999).  
54 Suzuki, Masayuki. (Yoo Yong Gu trans.), Kim Jong Il kwa Suryongje Sahoejuui [Kim Jong Il and Suryongje 
Society] (Seoul: Joonang Ilbosa, 1994).  
55 Amstrong, Charles, K., 'The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State,' Kim, Samuel S. 
(ed.), The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001).    
56 In explaining his corporatist argument, the history of Korea and the formation of North Korean state is unique 
cannot be easily identified by the political theories of the West. Cumings(1982/1983); Cumings, Korea's 
Place in the Sun (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Cumings(2004), op. cit. 
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system have been produced after the 1980’s.  If the arguments on the Suryong-political 
system, particularly the satellite state theory or the puppet regime theory can be summarized, 
it is as follows.  
 
Table 2: Methodologies and theories of Suryong-political systems 
 
 
Satellite state 
theory 
Puppet regime 
theory 
Power struggle 
theory 
Bloody purge 
theory 
Totalitarianism 
Confucianism 
Guerilla state 
Regular army 
state 
Corporatism 
Suryong system 
state 
Background Height of the Cold war 
Cold War/ 
Détente(’70) 
New Cold War/ 
Post-Cold War 
Cold War → 
Post- Cold War 
Cold War → 
Post-Cold war 
Contents Denial of autonomy 
Kim Il Sung’s 
Will to power 
Fractional 
struggles 
Analysis of 
power structure 
Confucian 
corollary 
North’s 
historical 
experience 
centered 
State-Society 
relationships 
Historic-cultural 
centered 
Methodological 
approach 
Ideology 
centered 
Ideology 
centered 
Power centered 
Ideology 
centered 
Power centered 
Power centered 
Historic-cultural 
centered 
Social structure 
Power centered 
Historic-cultural 
theory 
Social structure 
Purpose 
Anti-Soviet 
Union, 
Anti-North 
Korea 
Anti-
communism 
Anti-North 
Korea 
Anti-
communism 
Anti-North 
Korea 
Objective view 
of North Korea 
Objective view 
of North Korea 
Evaluation 
Control-
dependent 
relationships 
Socialist 
dependency 
Dismissal of 
history and 
reality 
Kim, Il Sung 
centered 
Stagnant view of 
history 
Kim Il Sung 
centered 
Kim, Il Sung 
centered theory 
Limitation of 
historical 
dynamics 
State-Society 
relationships 
Limitation of 
historical 
dynamics 
Major figures 
or Researchers 
Dept. of State, 
CIA, Dept. of 
Defense 
Scalapino 
Korean-
American 
scholars 
McCormack 
Kongdan Oh 
Victor Cha 
Wada Haruki Bruce Cumings Suzuki Masayuki 
 
 
 As seen above, during the early periods of Cold War, North Korea was understood as 
a satellite state of Soviet Union or a puppet regime and as such did not seem to merit an 
independent analysis. The power struggle theories of the 1950’s and 60’s, and studies 
centered on the purges were not too different.  However, corporatism and guerilla state 
(regular army) theories have distanced themselves from the Cold War conflict and with 
emphasis on the history of North Korea and concordant application of the power structure, 
which they later distance themselves from, they see the Suryong system based on much more 
broad analysis of state-society relationship.    
 
 However, their limitations are clear.  These (theories) have yet to distance 
themselves from obsessive concentration on absolute power structure.  In particular, focusing 
too much on Suryong political system as a system of absolute power, they ignore the 
historical reality and the decision making process taken by the North Korean leadership.  
Furthermore, these theories mentioned above cannot explain the continuous transformation 
and development of North Korea, the catalyst for its changes and also of the various internal 
conflicts and dynamics that consequently took place.  
 
  16
 In taking a step towards overcoming such limitations, this article will analyze the 
Suryong political system of North Korea as a result of dynamics of change and the choices 
made.  This will make possible the explication of the changes within the system as a tension 
between the socialist developmental ideals and its reality and also one between the ensuing 
conflict and the result of decisions made.  One can call this a ‘developmental strategic 
approach’.  And such methodologies will make possible for the acceptance of the preexisting 
works and yet at the same time, will expand further to create a new model which will 
overcome the preexisting limitations.  
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Diagram 1: The factors and the evolution of the formation of the Suryong political 
system of North Korea.  
 
 As clear from the above diagram, socialist states start out with the mission of 
developing and realizing the socialist ideals.  During this process, political power is not an 
Socialist Ideology – Development of Socialism 
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External Crisis  
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aggrandizement of personal power, but a ‘goal-oriented power’ that stimulates social changes 
and creates a social system and order from the above.57   
 
 Unlike Marx’s prediction, power in the context of successful socialist revolutions in 
underdeveloped nations assumes much more active role as an agent for restructuring and 
developing social order.  As such, it becomes the most vital instrument in the actualization of 
the socialist ideals.   This illustrates how the dispute over the developmental lines during the 
processes of socialist development inevitably escalates into power struggle.  Therefore, 
power struggle within socialist states should not be interpreted as it is.  North Korea is not an 
exception to the above phenomenon and in fact, the conflict and the struggles engaged by the 
developmental lines was what made it possible for the creation of the Suryong political 
system as we know today.  
 
2) ‘The Clash of the ‘Developmental’ Strategies and the Formation of the Suryong 
System.  
 
Utopia and Development 
 First of all we can understand the formation of the Suryong system in the context of 
getting over a common dilemma of utopia versus development in socialist states. In addition 
to this, the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the North Korea’s first generation of 
revolutionaries, the division of Korea and their contraposition to US and concurrent political 
and security crisis, the geopolitical condition of being surrounded by four power states and 
most of all, the strong ideological commitment in the construction of utopian society by the 
1st generation of the revolution, all made North Korea choose a path that was different from 
other socialist states. 58  That’s why the developmental line of North Korea, from the 
beginning walked a different path from that of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern European 
countries and the Suryong system was established as the needed system to maintain and 
develop the country.   
 
 Unlike the prediction of Marx, most of the socialist revolutions were successful in 
the underdeveloped states.  As a result, in order to achieve ideological objectives, social 
transformation and economic development, these nation states came to attribute much more 
significance to the usage of power.  The socialist nations faced dilemmas while confronting 
the structural contradictions inherent between the policy objectives of ideology and 
development and subsequently, the developmental objectives took on a much more urgent 
                                                 
57 As such, this article will analyze the Suryong system from the developmental point of view and yet at the 
same time, articulate power as political leadership. Meaning, North Korea’s Suryong system is less of 
pursuit of ‘absolute power’ and more of political structure that functions as nucleus of North Korea’s 
developmental strategy.  As for criticism towards the power-centered approach, see Robert Tucker’s Politics 
as Leadership (Columbia & London, Univ. of Missouri Press, 1981) 
58 The utopia that was sought by Kim Il Sung and his first generation of revolutionary colleagues contained the 
uniqueness of construction of communist society and the ideal of Korean society. If the universality was to 
follow the communist ideology, the particularity was to follow the present reality. In particular, for them, the 
utopia was to be a collective society that was made up of union of communist individuals and the image. 
Kim Il Sung repeatedly emphasized (in regards to this) was ‘an abundant social community where (one 
lived) in a house graced with tiled roof (as opposed to thatched roof) and eating white rice and meat’. 
Therefore, the utopia that they sought was socialism that was based on and developed from the ideology of 
communalism.  
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role. Lowenthal expressed this as dilemma of utopia versus development.  
 
 In general, the experiences within socialist states saw the primacy in the pursuit of 
ideological objectives during the early phases of the revolution.  But gradually pragmatic 
goals were introduced and in the end, the pragmatic goals ended up taking precedent.  This 
shows transformation of these states from ‘revolutionary state’ to ‘post-revolutionary state’ 
and implies changes within nature of the regime whereby the weakening of the ideology 
leads to the primacy of the pragmatic economic development.  Also, this has parallel 
relations to change of personnel from revolutionary elites to bureaucratic elites, highlighting 
the switch from being a ‘red’ to an ‘expert’.   
 
 Then what was North Korea’s developmental line?  Simply put, the developmental 
line of North Korea, from the beginning walked a different path from that of the Soviet 
Union, China and Eastern European countries. As Kim Il Sung expressed, as a part of their 
destined goal, North Korea had to pursue twin objectives of construction of socialist state and 
national reunification.59  And the perception of victim mentality and entrapment further 
fueled the commitment to ideology.  
 
 The policy line of North Korea was economic development that had on its top, the 
communistic reformation of human beings (the utopian objective).  This was expressed as 
thematic of dual occupation of spiritual and material fortresses and is noted for the 
superiority of the ideological factors over the material factors within the synthesis.  However, 
despite the superiority of given ideology, a line that neither maximized (the superiority of the 
ideology) nor leading to the dismissal of the pragmatist objectives existed as well. It was a 
compromised one. If that was the case, then how was North Korea to respond to this? The 
answer lay in the further solidification of the party, which was the foundational basis of 
socialist revolution and state construction and further intensification of the mass line that had 
survived through the national liberation struggles.  Here, they found means to forge stronger 
bond between the party and the mass.  
 
 The unification and the solidification of the party and the mass were carried out in 
two ways.  One was ideological education that sought to reform people into communist 
human beings and the other was an aggressive promotion of the mass-line.  And in order to 
successfully carry this out, leadership ‘from the top’ had to be stressed.  First, the thought 
revolution implied a thorough study and inculcation of ‘Juche’ ideology.  The inculcation of 
the ‘Juche’ ideology was a process to render one into a ‘political man’.  Second, the 
aggressive pursuit of the mass-line, as evinced in the Chollima Movement of the 1950’s and 
the Chongsan-ri Spirit and Chongsan-ri Method of the 1960’s, was to be a union of the party 
cadres and the masses.  In other words, this was to be union of the leader and the masses.  As 
Bruce Cumings has shown, North Korea’s mass line was not what Mao had sought in his 
speech of ‘from the mass, to the mass’ but that of ‘to the mass, from the mass and to the 
                                                 
59  In the mid-1950’s, Kim Il Sung saw the construction of socialism and ‘national unification’ as the two major 
projects of ‘Korean Revolution’ and among them, attributed primacy to ‘national unification’ above that of 
social development.   Kim Il Sung, ‘Dangwon dul sok eseo kyegup kyoyang saop ul teouk kanghwa halttae 
taehayo’ [The need for further intensification of class education of the party cadres], Kim Il Sung chojakjip 9 
(Pyongyang: Choson Nodongchulpansa, 1980).  
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mass’.60 
 
 The developmental strategy of North Korea that placed supremacy of the ideological 
objects faced crisis in 1950’s.  This was the death of Stalin and ensuing wave of post-
Stalinism.  As a result, North Korea, which became alarmed, underwent a major power 
struggle stirred by members within the party.  The ‘August Factional Incident’ of 1956 was a 
challenge towards Kim’s developmental strategy that placed emphasis on ideological 
objectives and along with the increasing wave of post-Stalinism, incited power struggles.  
The Soviet and the Yenan faction argued that the control of the military, the legislative, the 
juridical and the mass organizations should not be under the leadership of the party leader 
and attempted to separate power.61  Such attempt to separate power was related to the issue 
of increase in productivity that was being discussed at the time and posed a direct contrast to 
Kim Il Sung’s focus on development of heavy industrial-centered and simultaneous 
development of light industries and agriculture.  They placed more emphasis on the 
economic demands, in particular, the profit of the individual in comparison to Kim’s 
argument of socialist restructuring based on the mass ideological education.  This was an 
effort to bring the changes that occurred in Soviet Union in the aftermath of Stalin’s death; 
the shift away from heavy industrialization – the increased production of the necessary good 
– and partial liberalization and increased deregulation based developmental lines, into North 
Korea.   
 
 To Kim Il Sung, their demand was a challenge towards Juche and was resurrection 
of the toadyism of the past Korean communist movements which depended on Soviet Union 
and China.  Furthermore, at a time when North Korea was just beginning to launch socialist 
development amidst the ruination of the Korean War and despite the threat felt from the post-
Stalinist wave, the questions became perceived as between the ‘establishment of Juche’ or 
the ‘socialistic dependency’.  Consequently, their argument was seen as revisionism to Kim 
and challenge towards the supremacy of the ideological objectives.62 This decided 
differences in developmental lines ended in power struggles.  What later came to be depicted 
in the annals of North Korea as ‘the second arduous march’, the ‘August Faction Incident’ 
was a power struggle born out of clash between two developmental strategies.63   
 
 In the history of North Korea, the ‘August Faction Incident’ was the greatest 
challenge toward Kim Il Sung and also the greatest political upheaval ever to take place.  At 
the time, the sense of crisis felt by Kim Il Sung’s faction was so acute that in Nodong sinmun 
(Workers’ Daily), they announced public support of Soviet Union’s criticisms of Stalin.  For 
North Korea that had never officially criticized Stalin, this was unprecedented.64 This in turn, 
showed how the power struggle of the 1950’s in fact was domestic factional responses to the 
                                                 
60 Cumings(1974), op. cit. pp. 28-29. 
61 For this see Yi Tae Sop, p. 114 
62 In 1955’s Kim Il Sung’s public emphasis on ‘Juche’ can be seen as a warning towards such trends that began 
to appear after Stalin’s death.   
63  Kim Jong Il called the ‘August Faction Incident’ of 1956 as the ‘second arduous march’.  This was made in 
reference to the ‘100 days of arduous march’ that first took place during the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle 
from Nov. 1938 to Jan. of 1939.  Ho, Dam, Kim Jong Il Wiinsang [Biography of Kim Jong Il] (Tokyo:  Jae 
ilbon Chosonin chong ryonhaphoe chungang sangim wiwonhoe, 1996), p. 28 
64 Nodong sinmun, Aug. 1st, 1956 
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external stimuli posed.  As a result of the ‘August Faction Incident’, North Korea further 
intensified the ‘unification and solidification of the party and the mass’.  The victory of the 
Kim Il Sung’s faction spelled an increased and more thorough adherence to the existing 
developmental strategies. Further retrenchment of the party leadership into all organizations 
within the society and increased commitment to communist ideological revolution were 
promoted as well. In 1958, Kim Il Sung insisted that the central project of the time was in 
‘overcoming the remnants of the old capitalistic thinking and in rearming of the entire 
workers with communist ideology.65  
 
 Now surpassing socialism, it was communist ideology that was beginning to be 
emphasized.  And furthermore, the central committee of the party indeed became the brain of 
the party.  The consolidation of the party central committee with Kim Il Sung at its core 
meant the consolidation of Kim Il Sung’s power.  And thus began the traditionalizing of the 
anti-Japanese guerrilla struggles as revolution and the official appearance of the North 
Korean ‘traditionalism’.66   
 
Traditionalism and Revisionism  
 The crisis of the 1950’s was the invasion of revisionism that had been emblematized 
as post-Stalinism.  This line argued for placing the ideological objectives in the foreground, 
separating the party, the politics and the military and also, emphasized the supremacy of 
pragmatic objectives.  Much of the success of Kim Il Sung’s faction during the ‘August 
Faction Incident’ of the 1950’s lay in the total support Kim received from the core members 
of the party and the masses.  The support for Kim Il Sung’s ideological objectives came from 
not only his popular charisma, but also his daily contact with the masses and party cadres 
through the implementation of the mass line.  Kim Il Sung, while carrying on his argument 
with the Soviet and the Yenan factions, for most contentious issues in the debate, he utilized 
the strategy of directly appealing to the masses, in particular to the core party cadres and the 
most zealous of the workers.67 The mass line taken by Kim Il Sung was the most crucial 
impetus in pushing forward his developmental strategy of ‘the unification and the solidarity 
of the party and the mass’ onto the basis of mass support.  As a result, the mass supported 
                                                 
65 Kim Il Sung ‘Kongsanjuui kyoyange taehayo’[On the education of Communist Ideology(Nov. 20th, 1958)],  
Kim Il Sung chojakjip 12 (Pyongyang: Choson nodongdang chulpansa, 1981), p. 592. Furthermore, in a 
speech, he points out that “although we are trying to live by the spirit of collectivism, individualism is trying 
to undermine our collective achievement.” 
66  The ‘traditionalism’ used here is not of the conventional usage of the word ‘tradition’, but rendering of Kim 
Il Sung’s revolutionary struggles into tradition, in specific, ‘revolutionary traditionalism’.  ‘Revolutionary 
Traditionalism’ became official from the later 1950’s and through the Suryong system, became absolutized 
and institutionalized as it is known today.  
67  If the ‘August Faction Incident’ took the characteristics of power struggle that sought to resolve the internal 
party conflict, there were continued oppositions from various administrators and technocrats who where in 
line with the pragmatic objectives of the Soviet and the Yenan faction. Faced with this, Kim Il Sung, rather 
than continuing to appeal to the bureaucrats and the technocrats, directly appealed to the fervent support of 
the masses and used this as means to solidify his developmental lines.  The most famous example of this is 
his field leadership wielded at Kangsun Steel Company that later became the antecedent for the ‘Chollima 
Movement’.  When his conflict with the party and the bureaucrats surrounding the steel production did not 
abate easily, he took his case directly to the workers of the Kangsun Steel Company.  As a result, from here, 
on machines that was capable of producing 60, 000 tons of steel, (the company) produced 120, 000 tons.  
After this, such examples became models for nationwide mass movements.  
  22
Kim Il Sung and the Soviet and the Yenan factions lost out.    
 
 After the ‘August Faction Incident’, Kim Il Sung began to further reinforce his 
‘Juche’ line.  To Kim Il Sung, ‘Juche’ was similar to the developmental strategy that 
emphasized the primacy of ideological objectives in the construction of a utopian society.  
Overcoming the crisis of the 1950’s, revolutionary traditionalism began to be asserted in 
order to establish ‘Juche’ and the ideological revolutionary efforts, such as studies of 
communism, came to merit serious attention.  Revolutionary traditionalism was none other 
than traditionalizing Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla experiences and rearticulating it as 
the main principle for the ideology and the actions of the party and the mass.  By the end of 
the 1950’s, the traditionalizing of Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla activities coalesced 
with the establishment of ‘Juche’ and became the most important ideological and mass 
movement efforts.  And with this, the power and the prestige of Kim Il Sung catapulted even 
higher.   
 
 During the 1960’s, the crises came from different places.  There were three main 
crises that North Korea faced during this period; the security threat, the debate on speed and 
balance and the expansion of individualism.  First was the security threat.  The Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962 propelled an acute sense of security threat within North Korea.  Also, 
with Khrushchev’s revisionist line, the conflict between Soviet Union and China was 
beginning to escalate.  There was a split occurring within the socialist bloc.  
 
 Faced with such security threat and the schism of the socialist bloc, the response of 
North Korea was none other than the refortification of the ‘Juche’ ideology.  De-emphasizing 
the current economic development and opting instead for the line of ‘simultaneously carrying 
on the building up of the economy and defense’, the strengthening of the national defense 
was initiated.68  Publicly announced in 1962 and officially adopted in 1966, this ‘line of 
simultaneously carrying on the building up of the economy and defense’ was a response 
formed out of the supremacy of ideology- oriented strategy as championed by Kim.  
Hampered with limited resources and adhering to the stratagems of self-sufficiency, this line 
that simultaneously pursued the strengthening of national defense and the rapid economic 
growth became in reality, the fortification of the worker’s ideological thought processes and 
the maximization of the mass mobilization.    
 
 With the looming external threat, in order to mobilize the internal resources as 
greatly as possible, the collectivistic solidarity within (the society) had to be further bolstered 
and to do so the political leadership of the party had to be maximally flexed.  Kim Il Sung’s 
response to the external threats was to discipline the revolutionary ideology and become 
emphatic on the developmental strategy of strengthening the party.     
 
                                                 
68 North Korea’s line of ‘simultaneous carrying on the build up of the economy and defense’ was a 
developmental line that was formed in response to the external security threat.  With the adoption of this line, 
the economic development in North Korea began to face difficulties in the distortion of the resource 
distribution, disequilibrium of the economic structure and the burden of the cost of national defense.   Also 
with the pursuit of ‘the four great military lines’, all people were placed under the hardship of having to hold 
scythe and hammer on one hand and a gun on the other hand.  And North Korea began to pursue ‘war-time’ 
system of development.   
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 However, second crisis erupted from here as a result.  As encapsulated in the 
expression, ‘debate on speed and balance’, conflicts surrounding the pursuit of two different 
developmental strategies emerged.  To Kim Il Sung faction’s insistence on economic policy 
based on the superiority of continued speed, some groups within the party began to advocate 
for more balanced development of economy.  Their argument of balanced development 
policy reflected reforms or plural economic policies of the 1960’s Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe.  Specifically, they demanded for the increase of material incentives to the workers, 
the introduction of commodities-currency exchange value and opposed the strengthening of 
national defense as well as calling for relative accordance be given to the light industry.  And 
in this, they were critical of Kim Il Sung’s emphasis on speed based economic policies.69  
 
 Furthermore, their line was an opposition to the line of ‘simultaneously carrying on 
building up economy and defense’.  If the line of ‘simultaneously carrying on building up 
economy and defense’ was a line that reflected Kim Il Sung’s developmental strategy of the 
supremacy of ideology, their line was a developmental strategy that placed emphasis on 
pragmatism.  In other words, if the real objective for the Kim Il Sung’s line was in fact the 
strengthening of national defense and the pursuit of heavy industry dominated and an 
unequal developmental strategy for this very purpose, their line was to refute this and to 
promote balanced developmental strategy that placed the civilian economy first.   
 
 The third crisis came from the social laxity that came with the expansion of 
individualism.  Among workers, farmers and other masses, those whom were responsible for 
leading the economic development through Chollima Movement of the 1950’s, there began 
to appear symptoms of individualism and pragmatic sentiments.  The fervor of the early 
revolutionary phase was fading away and selfishness, negativism and conservatism began to 
seep in.   
 
 The rising individualism was the protracted result of the ‘fatigue symptoms’ that 
followed after a steady growth of the economy in the 1950’s and the attention shown to 
individual profit came on the foothill of achieving the growth.  These developments were 
related to the fact that although the mass mobilization of the 1950’s and the ensuing 
economic growth had brought much material gains, the security crisis of the 1960’s and the 
ensuing national defense strengthening efforts, in fact weakened the material incentives.  In 
reality, the wage increase of workers in 1960’s was minimal at best and investments in light 
industries were decreasing due to the rising distortion in the distribution of material resources 
that was caused by the strengthening of the national defense.70  This contributed to the 
                                                 
69  One example of this policy was the introduction of ‘bogus money’. ‘Bogus money’ was intended to calculate 
the wages of the workers in currency and then pay the workers with ‘bogus money’ first and depending on 
the quantity of the ‘bogus money’, paying the real wages accordingly. They first attempted to introduce this 
at the Keomduk mine, North Korea’s largest nonferrous production site, but faced with resistance from the 
workers, failed.   
70  The wage increase of the workers rose in 1954-1956 on average 58% and in periods from 1957-1960, almost 
134%. However, from 1961-1964, on average 5% and it was frozen until 1969.  In fact, one can conclude 
that during the 1960’s, there was very little, if any wage increases. Choi, Chung Kuk, ‘Urinara inmin 
kyongje palchon eseo ui sokto wa kyunhyong’ [On rapidity and balance in the people’s economic 
development of our nation], Kunroja, Feb. 1963(vol.3), p. 35; Chung, Hyuk Nam, ‘Inmin saenghwal ui 
hyangsang ul wihan uri tang ui pitnaneun kuhyon’ [The glorious realization by our party to improve the 
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weakening of material incentives and on the level of the individuals, fostered negativism and 
narrow departmentalism.  These negativism, conservatism and narrow departmentalism 
posed decisive hindrance to comprehensive (economic) growth attempted in the 1960’s.  
North Korea called these symptoms “great obstacles to technological innovation” and even 
argued that eradication of such tendencies will propel technological innovation forward. 71  
 
 In all of the three crises, the most critical problem was the second problem that rose 
under the guise of the third problem of social symptoms.  Some party cadres and politburo 
members, taking in the waning enthusiasm of the masses towards the revolution, tried to 
displace the ideological goals and posit pragmatic objectives at the forefront.  Furthermore, 
they challenged the revolutionary tradition or traditionalism that had been intensifying since 
the latter part of the 1950’s.  Their attacks assumed the appearance of North Korea’s internal 
recognition of the external security threats and the changes following the split within the 
socialist bloc.  In fact, like the 1950’s, this was an internal response to an external shock.   
 
 And this took the form of debates surrounding the pursuance of developmental 
strategies.  Much of the conflicts surrounding the developmental strategies were very much 
debates.  And yet, the revisionist tendencies underlying the ideological orientation of their 
developmental strategies could not be ignored.   Their challenges towards Kim Il Sung’s 
revolutionary tradition was a direct challenge towards the establishment of the ‘Juche’.72  If 
the crisis of the 1950’s could be characterized as challenge towards ‘Juche’, the crisis of the 
1960’s was very much a challenge towards the traditionalism that sought to consolidate 
‘Juche’.  
 
 The solution (proposed) to address the schism of the socialist bloc and the ensuing 
security threat, the challenge of the party revisionists towards traditionalism, the increasing 
individualism among the populace and the concomitant social laxity, was to strengthen the 
internal solidarity.  Even here, two conventional methods were mobilized.  One was the 
intensification of the ideological revolution and the other was the pursuance of the mass line.  
The ideological revolution meant rearmament with Kim Il Sung revolutionary ideology and 
the pursuit of mass line denoted increasing the revolutionary fervor of the entire population 
with the core workers functioning at the center.  And in order to do this, the directives from 
the top became even more intensified.  This was an outright refusal to recognize the attempt 
by the revisionists to separate control apparatuses or of the plurality that sought to inculcate 
                                                                                                                                                       
living standards of the people], Kunroja, Sept. 1965(vol. 18), p.13.  
71  Hong, Soon Kwon, ‘Sahoejuui kunsol ui apjang e seonun chongnyon dul ui yongyero un immu’ [the glorious 
responsibility of the youths who are at the forefront of construction of socialism], Kunronja, March, 1963 
(vol. 6), p. 9-10; By the 1960’s North Korea actively pursued economic development through science and 
technology. And these attempts produced moderate results. However, from the mid-60’s, the increased 
spending in national defense and its distortion of resource distributions led to severe lack of resources and 
also hampered domestic growth.  One cannot help point out increased expenditure in national defense as the 
historical cause of North Korea’s economic stagnation.  
72 Their challenge towards Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary tradition was expressed by their attempt to foster a cult 
of Pak Kum Chol, who was one of the leaders of the Kapsan faction. At the time, they controlled the 
propaganda bureau (Kim Toh Man) and tried to promote Pak’s revolutionary efforts as to be on par with 
Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary tradition, through plays and films. The one who discovered this and exposed 
their efforts, leading to their destruction was none other than Kim Jong Il. For Kim Jong Il’s activities at this 
time, see Chung, Yong Chul (2001), op. cit.  
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creative developments from below.      
 
 Unlike the response demonstrated in the 1950’s, during the crisis of the 1960’s, the 
party looked into means of forming the entirety of the society into an organic unit.  This was 
the latticing the unified solidarity of the Suryong, the party and the mass into a singular 
organism.  The Suryong system signified the birth of an organic social structure.73  The 
Suryong system that was founded in 1967 was very much the birth of an organic entity with 
Kim Il Sung, as the Suryong at the center with all the components of society organized into 
concentric unit surrounding him.  And the connective that linked all the various components 
was Kim Il Sung’s ideology or Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary tradition.  As a systemic 
expression of the traditionalists towards the challenges posed by the revisionists, the Suryong 
system had become finite.  
 
Individualism and Collectivism  
 The birth of the Suryong system, as seen above is an end result of collectivist and 
traditionalist responses towards the challenges of pragmatism, revisionism and individualism.  
The reason for North Korea’s insistence on collectivism and traditionalism in the end was 
very much for the establishment of their goal, the ‘Juche’.  In order to achieve this, they 
needed a complete enclosure from the revisionist ideology.  Furthermore, in order to 
eliminate the remaining traces of individualism and old capitalistic thoughts in people’s head, 
each individual had to become part of a unified whole and had to be armed with a single and 
collectivistic ideology.  As Allen Kassof has argued, since the pursuit of separate profit by 
individual and the collective is contrary to the demands of the center that seeks the 
conformity of the profit, individualism poses to undermine the system’s long-term goals.74  
Therefore, seen from this light, the Suryong system of North Korea was very much a 
totalitarian system.  
 
 If this was the case, then why did Kim Il Sung and North Korea’s elites made the 
historic decision to found the Suryong system?  Primarily, the reason derived from the goal 
of increasing power and heightening collectivism amongst the party and the mass with Kim 
at its center during the sharp clashes between the ideological objective and pragmatist goals, 
and that between the traditionalists and the revisionists.  And this can be seen as an end result 
of the power struggle that emanated from the internal strife within the party.  As such, the 
Suryong system of North Korea can be regarded as a result of Kim Il Sung’s increase of 
power earned from his victory in the struggle.  However, more importantly, the increase in 
power was not the end itself sought by Kim Il Sung, but was pursued as means to organically 
compose the whole society for the express purpose of establishing the ‘Juche’.   
 
 What the North Korean party leadership was concerned with the most in the 1960’s 
was the proliferation of individualism.  The proliferation of individualism posed a grave 
                                                 
73  The social organicism that has been argued by North Korea differs from the Stephan White’s theory of state 
organicism by its connotation towards an East Asian concept of ‘the great family’.  Bruce Cumings’ 
argument of socialist corporatism attempts to explain North Korea’s organic structure from this point of 
view as well.   
74   Kassof, Allen, 'The Administered Society: Totalitarianism without Terror,' World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 4 
(July, 1964), pp. 558-575. 
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threat to North Korea that already felt threatened by the security crisis.  The adoption of the 
line of ‘simultaneous building up of defense and economy’ and the implementation of ‘the 
four great military lines’ with its increased expenditure in defense posed great problems to 
building an economy and in this worsening condition, higher mobilization of labor 
productivity and discipline and commitment in the work place had to be secured to continue 
the growth.   
 
 The reality however, was the expansion of the symptoms of ‘fatigue’ following the 
rapid growth of the1950’s and the profusion of individualism following the emergence of 
revisionism.  This became manifested as negligence and laziness in the work place, violation 
of rules, and obsession with profit.  And as such this went very much against productivity-
oriented culture of socialism.  At that time, the proliferation of individualism had direct 
impact on the economic growth.  The first ‘7 year plan’ that was ambitiously put forward (by 
the leadership) could not be carried out as planned and in the period of 1965-66, the gross 
agricultural and industrial output was registered in the minus. The national income in 1966 
had also significantly dropped below as well.  In 1966, the growth percentage of the 
agricultural output was -13.6%, the industrial output was -3% and the national income 
growth was -8.5%.75 The cause for the decline in economic growth lay in the distortion of the 
resource distribution due to the increased defense expenditure and the proliferation of 
individualism.  Therefore, Kim Il Sung could not ignore the rise of individualism.   
 
 Combating individualism could not be carried out by strengthening of Kim Il Sung’s 
power alone.  In order to respond to such trend, the populace was amalgamated into fully 
mobilized units and the possession of a routine, organizational, disciplinary and self-
sacrificial abilities were demanded from them.  This was to transform the social structure of 
North Korea into a one organic unit.  And the precedent for this, they found in Kim Il Sung’s 
anti-Japanese guerrilla struggles of the past where in this unit comprised of the supreme 
commander at its center, the soldiers came to acquire synchronized mobilization and order 
and a quality of absolute self-sacrifice.  The fundamental nature of North Korea’s Suryong 
system came from here.  With the increase in Kim Il Sung’s absolute power, the goal (of the 
Suryong system) was in transfiguring the populace into entering a relationship between that 
of the Suryong and the soldier.76  This was the creation of a North Korean style of 
collectivism.  The basic reason for North Korea’s decision to found Suryong system derives 
from this motivation.  
 
 The collectivism sought by North Korea was carried out in two directions.  One was 
to form the party and the mass into a unified organism and the other was to arm them with 
the single ideology of the Suryong that was intended to act as a connecting tissue for these 
relationships.  In order to create a unified solidarity amongst the party and the mass, the first 
task was to create a single union of all social organizations with the party at the center.   
First, the party that had begun as communist party in the early period, was renamed as the 
Workers’ Party in 1946 (South Korean Workers’ Party and North Korean Workers’ Party 
                                                 
75 For statistics on North Korean economy from 1950’s to 1960’s, see Yi, Tae Sop, op. cit. p. 210-228.  
76 The model of Suryong-soldier relationship derives from Kim Il Sung’s experience in the anti-Japanese 
guerilla days.  Considering this, Wada Haruki’s ‘guerrilla state’ theory is convincing in its description of the 
characteristic features of the North Korean system.   
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respectively) and in 1949, was finally amalgamated into Choson Workers’ Party.  The Party 
was to be formed of exemplar members of the society and was to represent all strata of the 
society.  Currently, the membership in Choson Workers’ party reaches over 15% of the 
population.  When compared to other socialist states, this registers higher ratio of population 
per party members.  If one were to compare this to the 1983 statistics, the Soviet Union 
registered its membership at 18 million or 6.7% of the population, Czechoslovakia with 1.6 
million at 10.4%, Romania with 3.3 million at 14%, Vietnam with 1.7 million at 3.0%, 
Mongolia with 70, 000 at 4.2% and China with 40 million at 3.8%.  Compared with these 
nations and Romania, North Korea’s ratio of population per party membership remains quite 
high.77  
 
Table 3: The Increasing trend in the membership of Choson Workers’ Party 
 
Time Period Number of Members 
Number of Party 
Cells 
The 3rd Assembly of the Expanded Directorial Committee of the North 
Korean Division of Choson Communist Party (1945.12) 4,530  
The Founding Congress of North Korean Worker’s Party 
(1946.8) 366,000 12,000 
The 2nd National Congress of North Korean Worker’s Party (1948.3) 725,762 29,762 
The 5th Assembly of the Central Committee Members. (1952.12) 1,000,000 48,933 
The 3rd National Congress of Choson Workers’ Party (1956.4) 1,164,945 58,258 
The 4th National Congress of Choson Workers’ Party (1961.9) 1,311,563 65,000 
The 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Choson Worker’s Party 
(1965.10) Approx. 1,600,000  
The 5th National Congress of Choson Workers’ Party (1970.11) Approx. 1,730,000  
<Nodong sinmun> Aug. 29th 1972. article Approx. 2,000,000  
<Nodong sinmun> Jan. 29th 1978. article Approx. 2,000,000 200,000 
The 6th National Congress of Choson Workers’ Party (1980. 10) Approx. 3,220,000 Approx. 210,000 
 
*Source: Ministry of National Unification, 2004 Pukhan Kaeyo (2004 North Korea Compendium) (2003. 12) 
**The figure for party membership of 1980 was calculated on the basis of one representative per 1000 party 
member.  Currently, it is difficult to assess the exact number of North Korea’s party membership.  Some sources 
state the party membership of 1980 to be around 2 million and from this extrapolate the 1988 membership 
figure around 2.5 million.  
***Membership in KWP is possible over 18 yrs of age, and must spend one year as a candidate cadre.  
 
                                                 
77 What such high ratio of population per party membership shows is not only the mass nature of the party but 
also the bureaucratization and the overloading of responsibilities. In fact, with the party intervening upon all 
organization and sectors, the organizational whole of the party was swelling.  
  28
 Not only this, but the mass organizations that have party as its center comprises all 
components of the society.  In fact, workers’, farmer’s, youth and women’s organizations all 
are formed as masses with the party as its root and the branches.  
 
Table 4: The current status of major mass organizations in North Korea 
 
Name of Organization Eligibility Membership Organizational modus operandi and activities 
Foundation 
date 
The general federation 
of trade unions of 
Korea 
Laborers, Urban 
workers 
(age 31 to 65, woman 
60) 
Approx. 
1,600,000 
- work place units 
- ideological education, skills learning, 
productivity competition leadership 
Nov. 30th, 
1945 
The union of 
agricultural workers of 
Korea 
Agricultural cooperative 
members 
(31 to 65, w oman60) 
Approx. 
1,300,000 
- agricultural workers 
- ideological education, agricultural 
production leadership 
Jan. 31st, 
1946 
The Kim Il Sung 
socialist youth league 
Youth 
(14 to 30) 
Approx. 
6,000,000 
- Schools and work units 
- party’s reserve, ideological education, 
labor mobilization 
Jan. 17th, 
1946 
The Korean 
democratic women's 
union 
Women 
(31 to 60) 
Approx. 
200,000 
- Women with no organizational 
association 
- Ideological education, labor 
mobilization 
Nov. 18th, 
1945 
The Korean children's 
union 
Children 
(7 to 13) 
Approx. 
2,000,000 
- School units 
- communal living June, 1946
 
*Source: Kim Dong Kyu, Pukhanhak chongnon [Collection of North Korean Studies], 
(Seoul: Kyoyukkwahaksa, 1999), p. 142 
 
 Such mass organizations, under the political leadership of the party, function as a 
transmission belt. In short, the unified solidarity of the party and the mass has become 
structuralized through the union of the party and mass organizations. On the other hand, what 
cements the connection between the party and the mass organizations is the Suryong 
ideology.  The party is placed as the vanguard unit to actualize the Suryong ideology and the 
party and based upon the Suryong ideology, the party carries out its political leadership 
towards the state and into all mass organizations.  In order to do this, what is emphasized is 
the maximal ideological education.  The thought education is carried under the guidance of 
the party towards all the members of the mass organizations.  Therefore, the objective of 
North Korea’s collectivism is the unification of ideology and organizations.   
 
 In general, the Suryong system or the organization of an entire society with the 
Suryong at the center provides a picture of strict hierarchy.  However, as Bruce Cumings has 
pointed out, the Suryong system has a concentric structure with Suryong as its core.  Kim Il 
Sung compared the one heart unity of Suryong-party-mass as akin to a peach.  The concentric 
relationship of the seed, the flesh and the skin was North Korea’s Suryong system.78 The 
                                                 
78  Kim, Il Sung, ‘Minjok Olympic wiwonhoe wiwonjang kyum sajang ilhaeng kwa han damhwa’ [A 
conversation with the National Olympic committee head and its members], Kim Il Sung chojakjip 43 
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North Koreans describe their society as a ‘big family’. 79  In other words, what connect the 
relationship between Suryong-party-mass are not coercive measures and disciplines but 
fraternity and loyalty that act like parental love to bond the members of the family together.80  
The fraternity and loyalty that acts as substitute for parental love and blood ties in the family 
originated from the days of the anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. Such definition of 
relationship demands putting the creativity of the collective before the individual and the 
greater good of the collective over the individuals as well.  
 
 Then how was the Suryong system possible?  As seen above, the evaluation of the 
Suryong system of North Korea has been analyzed from the ideological and power-centered 
approaches. However, as a ‘purposeful leadership’, the secret for the birth of the Suryong 
system was in the union with two other leaderships.  The personality leadership possessed by 
Kim Il Sung himself and the positional leadership that came about as a result of increase of 
his power.81  The charisma of Kim Il Sung had by far the most popularity in North Korea.  
The formation of Kim Il Sung’s charisma has been emphasized through his anti-Japanese 
credentials and his abilities and the results shown in the socialist reforms of the early period 
(land reform and other various reform measures) in North Korea.  Furthermore, his ordinary 
contact with the mass made possible a more easy infusion of his personality leadership into 
the mass.  Such amassing of the personality leadership was decisively further intensified 
through the study of Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary tradition and its institutionalization from 
the latter part of the 1950’s.     
 
 This was the process of creating a more systematized leadership.  The Suryong 
system was based on Kim Il Sung’s personality leadership and creating an union with his 
power and as a result, the Suryong system was a personalized leadership which attributed 
absolute place and role to Kim Il Sung.82  Certainly, during this process, North Korea’s 
cultural tradition or the Confucian patriarchy played a major role, and the pressure from the 
power above was a decisive factor.   However, the most important factors were Kim Il Sung 
and the reality that surrounded him and his concordant responses.  
                                                                                                                                                       
(Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang chulpansa, 1996), p.139.  
79  North Korea declared in 1976 that ‘our society had transformed into one big family’.  Editorial, ‘Yongsaeng 
pulmyol ui juchesansang yi kuhyun han kachang uwolhan uri nara sahoejuui chedo rul teouk kongko 
palchon sikkimyo cholongsong kachi jikija’ [Let us further develop and steely defend the superior socialist 
system of ours that have been saved by the immortal ideology of Juche] Kunroja, 1976, vol. 9. p.7. The 
interesting fact is that the declaration of North Korean society as a ‘big family’ was declared about 10 years 
after the official establishment of the Suryong system in 1967. The above can be interpreted as the 
manifestation of the previous efforts Suryong system that had begun to take root.  
80  Fraternity and loyalty can be a ‘lesson of blood’ learned during Kim Il Sung’s activity as anti-Japanese 
guerrillas.  What allowed small guerrilla members to survive was fraternity and loyalty to each other.  
81  Here I interpret personality leadership to be personalized leadership and positional leadership as the ensuing 
power and structural mechanism.  According to this, the personality leadership was created on the basis of 
Kim Il Sung’s own charisma and power, and the positional leadership has been formed on the basis of Kim 
Il Sung’s position within the system.  As for the formation of Kim Il Sung’s leadership, see, Chung, Yong 
Chul, ‘Kim Il Sung kwa Kim Jong Il leadership pikyo’ [Comparative analysis of the leaderships of Kim Il 
Sung and Kim Jong Il],’ Kyeongje wa Sahoe, Fall 2002 (vol.55).    
82  One good way of understanding the Suryong system of North Korea is to compare it to the activities and the 
managerial policies of large conglomerates.  Their visits to work sites and the governing orders, unitary 
corporate ethics and its following management policies show similarities to the Suryong system of North 
Korea.  
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3) Unintended consequences:  The dilemma of the ‘conversion’ to the purpose and the 
means 
 The birth of the Suryong system signaled the transformation of the North Korea into 
a uniquely different system.  The effort to create a collectivist society or social organicism 
demanded a tightly woven order from all elements of ideology, politics, economy, society 
and culture.  As a result, North Korea in the 1970’s undertook efforts to reorganize the lax 
social organizations and the theoretical systematization of Juche ideology and saw the 
creation of collectivist aesthetics and culture and uniformed leadership within politics.   
 
 First, the Juche ideology was promoted as the official state ideology.  During the 5th   
National Congress of the Choson Workers’ Party, the Juche ideology was promoted as the 
leading ideology along with Marxist-Leninism.  And gradually replacing Marxist-Leninism, 
it came to be recognized as the sole ideology.  By the 1980’s, the constitution of the party 
recognized Juche ideology as their only leading ideology.83 Now, the Juche ideology was 
transformed from practical ideology to pure ideology.84 As the unitary ideology, the Juche 
ideology became the principle for all of North Korea’s social organizations and activities.  
And from this, as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continuously emphasized, North Korea 
transformed into a system ruled by no other ideologies than Juche.    
 
 Next, there were changes within the political structures.  In order to secure the 
leadership of the Suryong, the Juseok system was created and the monolithic system of 
leadership by Suryong that oversaw party-government-military was formed.  The supreme 
people’s assembly that had presided over the juridical sphere became defunct and with the 
cabinet becoming policy administrative board, the role came to be placed with the chairing 
committee.  With the adoption of socialist constitution in 1972, absolute power was bestowed 
upon the Juseok.  
 
 Afterwards, the massive cult of Kim Il Sung was undertaken.  With the ‘10 
Principles on establishing the monolithic ideological system’, absolute obedience and loyalty 
to the Suryong became the most important social values.85  With such idolization, all 
expressions regarding Kim Il Sung and everything surrounding him became objects of 
worship.  Furthermore, such cult of worship extended even to his family.   
 
 Such transformation brought unintended consequences.  Although the Suryong 
system had its original purpose in socialist collectivism, many contradictory symptoms began 
to appear.  Furthermore, the Suryong system, as a goal for collective society became means 
                                                 
83  After this, the Juche ideology undergoes systematization and in 1985 with the publication of 10 volume 
works on the Juche ideology, the ideology came to possess a theoretically completed system.   
84 As for pure ideology and practical ideology see, Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist 
China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1968). 
85 ‘The 10 Principles regarding the establishment of monolithic ideological system’ was put forward by Kim 
Jong Il and demanded absolute and implicit loyalty to Kim Il Sung.  It also, demanded loyalty to himself, the 
successor.  For this see, Kim Jong Il, ‘Chon dang kwa on sahoe e yuilsasang chegye rul teouk teunteun yi 
seuuja’ [Let us further strengthen the monolithic ideological system throughout the entire party and the 
society] (April, 14th, 1974),’ Juche hyukmyong wiop ui wansong ul wihayo 3 [To complete the revolution of 
Juche] (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang chulpansa, 1987) 
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itself.  The Suryong system came to replace the collectivism.  
 
 As an unintended consequence of the Suryong system, the creativity of an individual 
was first severely limited.  Kim Jong Il argued that ‘creativity was impermissible for 
ideology’.86 With the stifling of individual creativity, individuals became loyal and passive 
beings who faithfully carried out the task issued from above.  The Suryong system was 
created to counteract the variant of the individualism of the 1960’s and the cooling down of 
the revolutionary fervor of the workers and their negativism and yet, it ended up creating a 
new form of negativism.  Such negativism, when seen from the viewpoint of the individual, 
was a rational choice.87   
 
 To respond to this new development, many ‘innovative movements’ were initiated 
from the top, but with the weakening of the material incentives and the continued primacy of 
the political ideology, these measures did not reap much success.  With the maximization of 
the ideological goals, the pragmatic objectives were constrained. Furthermore, with Suryong 
system replacing the collectivism, the transference of the means and the objectives occurred.  
The collectivism which Suryong system pursued was introduced as the community of the 
‘revolutionary Juche’.  And this was what North Korea attempted to achieve through the 
merger of the Suryong, the party and the masses.  However, as the Suryong system came to 
replace the collectivism itself, the Suryong system became the absolute power structure.   
 
 These problems showed that as the present North Korea continuously transformed 
itself through the contemporaneous problems it historically faced, the rising set of new 
problems pressured changes upon the system.  This meant that the introduction of the 
Suryong system into the society did not signal the completion of the collectivism of North 
Korean society.  The present situation demanded sustained resolution to the problems of 
bureaucratism and new forms of individualism that were inherent within collectivism.       
 
 And these new challenges ruptured during the catastrophic crises of the 1990’s, and 
bearing the task of resolving these problems is what North Korea faces today.  The historical 
experiences and decisions arisen during the materialization of the utopian reality and 
contemporary developmental problem are forcing as even at this moment, changes in North 
Korea.  
 
 However, despite the unintended consequences and the rising new challenges, North 
Korean society under the Suryong system today when compared to other societies, possesses 
                                                 
86  Kim Jong Il, ‘Dang saop ul kunbonjok uiro kaeson kanghwa hayo on sahoe ui Kim Il Sung juuihwa rul him 
itkye takuchija’ [Let’s carry out fundamental improvement and intensification of the party projects so that 
we can further strength Kim Il Sung-ism through out the entire society], Juche hyukmyong wiop ui wansong 
ul wihayo 3 [To complete the revolution of Juche], (Pyongyang: Choson Nodongdang Chulpansa, 1987), 
p.225 
87 With the further intensification of the order from the above, for the individuals below, the rational choice was 
to simply carry out the given task.  Uncalled for creative initiative could cause political turmoil and create a 
situation where one would have to bear responsibility for the result.  It was a form of bureaucratism and self-
protectionism.  As such symptoms began to manifest, Kim Jong Il began to criticize that the cadres were 
only carrying out the given task, but were not tackling the work with enthusiasm.  This is a structural 
problem that was brought by the Suryong system.  
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long durability that comes from strong collectivistic solidarity, formation of organic social 
structure and the construction of the Suryong-centered social values.  This demonstrates to 
certain extent, the success of the collectivistic formation of the society that was originally 
intended by the Suryong system society.  Clearly, one cannot surmise the completion of the 
collectivism with the establishment of the Suryong system.  The endless conflict between 
individualism and collectivism cannot be resolved with the establishment of system itself 
alone.  Accordingly, even with the establishment of the Suryong system, North Korea had to 
further intensify the ideological revolution.   
  
 The Suryong system shows the long continued struggle against bureaucratism and 
systematic ideological education and reinforcement of studies undertaken to combat 
individualism and revisionism.   And as a result, this became the foundation of internal 
strength that allowed the system to survive despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European socialist bloc and the great policy reversal by China.  What makes North 
Korea significantly different from other socialist states is found here.  
 
4. Conclusion:  The Dilemma of Utopia and Development 
 The establishment and the intensification of the Suryong system transformed North 
Korean society into a single unitary organizational society and forged an organic state based 
upon the unification of the leader and the ideology.  However, the Suryong system faced a 
crisis in 1994.  This was the death of Kim Il Sung.   
 
 The death of Kim Il Sung can be considered as historical division in North Korea.  
That is, since the declaration of the government of DPRK, it has not once experienced power 
changes during peacetime or even following the death of a supreme leader.  Furthermore, no 
one could predict what the effect of the death of the Suryong, or Kim Il Sung would bring to 
the society.  Compounding the situation furthermore, at the time, North Korea was 
experiencing the collapse of the socialist bloc, the escalation of the tension with US 
regarding nuclear issues and was undergoing one of the most severe food shortage crisis.  
Many defectors were crossing the border and social order was unraveling.  Cracks were 
beginning to appear on the collectivity and organizational ability demanded by the Suryong 
system.  In a situation such as this, the choice for Kim Jong Il who had just inherited the 
Suryong system - in fact, the architect of the system - was very clear.  The existing Suryong 
system had to be continued.   
 
 Having completed the ‘arduous march’ from 1994, from 1998, Kim Jong Il began to 
call for ‘army centered politics or military first politics’.  The ‘army centered or military first 
politics’ is not, as some have referred to as, a political system that is dependent on the 
military.  The ‘army centered politics’ came about as a result of Kim Il Sung’s death, the 
collapse of the socialism, the security threat surrounding the nuclear missile issues with the 
US and the economic crisis within the system.   
 
 The ‘army centered politics’ as defined by North Korea is first, the securing of 
peaceful condition, second, the role of the military as the leading charge, third, expansion of 
the exemplarity of the military in the society and fourth, the armament with revolutionary 
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army spirit.88  With the ‘army centered politics’, the military functions as a force holding the 
gun in its confrontation with the (American) imperialist forces and the other, as the vanguard 
in reconstructing the collapsed economy from the very forefront and also aims to reorganize 
the workers, the farmers and the urban workers as well as of the entire society.   
 
 In North Korea, the military had not only been active in its traditional role as a force, 
but also as labor supply as well.  In fact, the military in North Korea was a ‘uniformed labor 
force’ and with the crisis of the 1990’s, their dual role as military and labor force only 
became more pronounced.  This can be confirmed in the fact that before ‘army centered 
politics’ entered official discussion in 1998, the military had been already massively 
mobilized into major economic constructions of the society.89  Therefore, the ‘army centered 
politics’ is not politics dependent on the military, but North Korea’s own unique governing 
practice that sought to overcome the crisis of the 1990’s and produce new alternatives.   
 
 And this is closely related to the changed situation surrounding the Suryong system 
of North Korea as well.  As argued above, the Suryong system is the collectivization of the 
entire society and this has shown in the formation of the Suryong, the party and the mass as 
the revolutionary Juche and the organization and disciplining of the entire society.  In the 
crisis of the 1990’s, the unit that still managed to maintain its organizational, disciplinary and 
self-sacrificial capabilities was the military.  Also, military was a unit that can absolutely 
obey the orders of the supreme commander and exhibited the ideal examples demanded by 
the Suryong system.   
 
 At a time when the party organizations were debilitated and unable to perform its 
crisis management, in the 1990’s, the military was the sole unit capable of socially 
reconstructing the collectivity and organizational capacity asked by the Suryong system.  The 
reason for (the adoption of) ‘army centered politics’ lay in the expansion of the 
organizational, disciplinary and self-sacrificial capabilities as well as the absolute loyalty to 
the supreme commander as possessed by the military into the rest of the society. 90  To be 
precise, this was an expansion of the effort model of the party organizations within the 
military into the rest of the society.91  For this reason, the ‘army centered politics’ contains 
                                                 
88  Kim, Dong Nam, ‘Widaehan ryongdoja Kim Jong Il tongji ui sonkun chongchi nun sahoejuui kyongje 
kangkuk kunsol ui kyolchong jok dambo’ [The army centered politics of the supreme leader Kim Jong Il is 
the decisive collateral in the construction of socialist economic power nation]. Kyongje yongu, 2002. vol. 2  
89 The mobilization of the military into large scale construction sites can be found in the Mount Keumkang 
power plant (Anbyon youth power plant), Pyongyang-Kaesong highway expansion project, Mount Keumsoo 
historical palace construction and massive infusion into Daeheungdan agricultural estate.  In particular, the 
heroics shown by the military in the construction of the Mount Keumkang power plant later became the 
model for later ‘revolutionary army spirit’.  Especially, the history of the construction of the Mount 
Keumkang power plant became published as a novel titled, Chonggum ul dul’go [Holding aloft the bayonet] 
(Pyongyang: Munhak yesul chulpansa, 2002).   
90 Kim Jong Il emphasized that the society need to learn the examples set by the military.  Kim Jong Il, ‘Olhae e 
dang saop eseo hyukmyongjok chonhwan ul irukindae taehayo’ [On having accomplished revolutionary 
reversal in the party efforts this year], (Jan. 1st. 1997), Kim Jong Il sonjip 14 (Pyongyang: Choson 
Nodongdang chulpansa, 2000). 
91 The core of the ‘army centered politics’ is based on the evaluation of the party organizational efforts of the 
military.  The argument is that the reason for the army’s ability to maintain its position during time of crisis 
is due to the firm upholding of the party organizations within the military. 
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the core of Kim Jong Il’s Suryong political system.  And concomitantly, Kim Jong Il’s ‘army 
centered politics’ can also be interpreted as Kim Jong Il’s resolve to never abandon the 
‘Juche’ line consolidated during Kim Il Sung’s time.   
 
 North Korea today is at a crossroad having to make difficult decisions regarding the 
Suryong political system.  That is, they are facing the dilemma of whether to continue with 
the utopian goal as demanded by the Suryong system or to further incorporate the pragmatic 
objectives.  The army centered politics show North Korea’s commitment to the primacy of 
the ideological objective.  However, a wide unabridged gap lies between the will and the 
reality and this can be seen in North Korea’s current situation.   
 
 This is related to North Korea’s recent pursuit of pragmatic policies.  The increased 
pursuit of pragmatic policies is closely tied to North Korea’s reform and liberalization 
policies. The new economic management improvement policy of 2002(‘7.1 policy’) can be 
seen as a strategic choice made by North Korea that had managed to survive the crisis of the 
1990’s.  The ‘7.1 Policy’ has adopted pragmatist policies such as the separation of power, 
deregulation, material incentives and others as means for promoting economic growth.  The 
most dramatic transformation is the introduction of the market and the increased usage of 
commodities-currency exchange.  Such changes in North Korea can be analyzed as pursuing 
the dual strategies of maintaining the Juche line and the primacy of the ideological objective 
and achieving the pragmatic objectives at the same time.  
 
 Although the reforms and the liberalizations seen in North Korea today gives more 
active recognition to individual initiatives, when seen within the framework of the Suryong 
system, these are also intended to not to undermine the collectivism as well.  How this will 
be played out, further observation needs to be made.  However, unless the current economic 
conditions improve, the tensions immanent in individualism and collectivism will more likely 
exacerbate.  This is the dilemma that the Suryong system, the ideal pursued by North Korea 
faces and the most real dilemma that is confronting the ‘army centered politics’ today.  
 
 The ideal of the utopia is impossible unless the supporting developmental objectives 
are met.  As in the case of China, where the primacy placed on pragmatic goals in the 
construction of the utopia resulted in the totalization of the pragmatic objectives as the 
absolute, North Korea also cannot be freed of such dilemmas as well.  And yet, despite such 
dilemmas, North Korea will not easily abandon collectivist development strategies to 
(achieve) utopian ideals.  For North Korea, abandoning the collectivist developmental 
strategy will signify the disintegration of the Suryong as the political system and this would 
in effect spell the dissolution of their own system.   
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